







 4 From ‘Economic Miracle’ to the 
‘Sick Man of the Socialist Camp’
Poland and the West in the 1970s 
 Aleksandra Komornicka 
The 1970s were a particular decade in Polish history. In December 1970, an 
economic and political crisis resulting from price increases led to the dismissal 
of Władysław Gomułka as head of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) 
and the appointment of a new leadership. Edward Gierek’s takeover of power 
symbolised a new beginning and hope for constructive reforms in Poland. Nev-
ertheless, ten years later in August 1980, Gierek and his political agenda were 
also dismissed in a context of economic and political crisis. However, despite 
some similarities, Poland’s situation in the summer of 1980 was very different 
to that before Christmas in 1970. Strikes were no longer spontaneous worker 
demonstrations but instead a coordinated cross-country movement supported by 
powerful dissident organisations. Moreover, this time the protesters demanded 
not only an improvement in economic and labour conditions but also human 
rights, such as freedom of speech, which the socialist regimes had committed to 
respecting in the Final Act of the CSCE, signed in August 1975. The economic 
situation which underlaid the political upheaval was additionally complicated by 
$22 billion in debts owed to Western creditors which had accumulated over the 
previous ten years. Unlike in 1970, the crisis could hardly be explained without 
considering Western influence or be handled independently of Western actors. 
The ties between socialist Poland and the capitalist world were the most irrevers-
ible outcome of Gierek’s decade. 
Despite the paramount impact which the unprecedented opening up towards the 
West had on the situation of the Polish socialist regime, it has rarely been studied 
as an independent phenomenon.1 Instead, the historiography of the 1970s deals 
predominantly with the two crises, their origins and consequences.2 The empha-
sis on revolts against the regime, however, results in a perception of political 
decisions, including those concerning economic and foreign policy, being solely 
responses to pressure from society. The strategy of the Polish socialist elite is 
therefore usually regarded as a constant balancing of claims by the population on 
the one hand and commands arriving from the Soviet Union on the other. How-
ever, looking at the socialist regimes from a comparative perspective allows the 
differences between national strategies to be highlighted and therefore the social-
ist elites to be rediscovered with their convictions, interpretations and goals as 












Poland: ‘Economic Miracle’ to ‘Sick Man’ 79 
This study contributes to this task by reconstructing the strategy of the Pol-
ish socialist elite and its dynamics between the 1970 and 1980 crises, a period 
marked by international détente and accelerating globalisation. While in these 
circumstances all the European socialist regimes increased their cooperation with 
the capitalist countries, aiming to improve their international and economic situ-
ations, Poland was not only the frontrunner in exchanges with the actors on the 
other side of the Iron Curtain but also was the country which ended the decade 
with the most spectacular economic and political crisis. As a consequence, in
the Polish case, alongside scrutinising the motivations and expectations behind 
the policy of opening up, the question also arises concerning the exaggerated 
scale of this phenomenon. 
This chapter argues that the opening towards the West was an outcome of the 
socialist elite’s ambition. This sentiment, which was driven by the traditional 
Polish aspiration for international grandeur, was reinforced in the 1970s by con-
fidence that the socialist state, even though unreformed, could experience an eco-
nomic revival and that détente would remain a permanent feature of international 
relations. However, as problems accumulated, the groups of policymakers who 
shared these assumptions became increasingly small. The history of Poland in the 
1970s is therefore not only a history of the escalating influence of Western actors 
on the domestic situation but also a history of internal decomposition caused by 
declining confidence and unity among the socialist elite. 
Towards détente, the late 1960s 
Poland was one of the socialist regimes most politically, economically and cul-
turally linked with Western Europe before the Second World War. While during 
the Stalinist years these economic exchanges almost disappeared, unofficial ties 
persisted. Polish emigration, on a scale and with an influence unseen in the cases 
of the other socialist regimes, played an essential role in maintaining private and 
cultural connections with the other side of the Iron Curtain. In this sense, Polish 
society exerted persistent pressure on the leadership to open up and positively 
welcomed any sign of rapprochement between the two parts of the continent. 
At the official level, a major revival of Polish cooperation with capitalist coun-
tries took place after 1953 thanks to the process of de-Stalinisation. The idea of a 
national way to socialism, which triumphed in 1956 with the takeover of power 
by Gomułka, who had been imprisoned between 1951 and 1954 under allega-
tions of national deviation, allowed Poland to loosen its dependence on Mos-
cow and enhance its activity in the international arena.3 Relying on his initial 
massive domestic support, the new first secretary of the PUWP openly rejected 
Soviet pressure concerning, for instance, collectivisation, which eventually failed 
to cover more than 11% of the land overall. 4 His insubordinate position, however, 
often drove him into conflict with the Soviet Union, which did not hesitate to 
threaten Poland economically with cuts in the supply of resources.5 
In this context, the idea of expanding relations with the capitalist countries 
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Moscow. Aiming to secure room for independent manoeuvre through hard-
currency income, Poland increased its exports of agricultural products and raw 
materials to the West. Gomułka considered the mining industry to be particularly 
important in guaranteeing Poland’s international position. The focus on indus-
trialisation but overlooking both innovation and domestic consumption, how-
ever, already in the mid-1960s resulted in economic stagnation. In this period, 
the Western countries appeared not only as recipients of Polish exports but also 
as an important source of new technology, and in some cases consumer prod-
ucts, which were repeatedly lacking in the domestic market. In order to facilitate 
these imports and the access of Polish goods to Western markets, in 1967 Poland 
joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), becoming the second 
socialist state in the organisation after Czechoslovakia. Similarly, in the late 1960s 
it reached bilateral trade agreements with France and the UK. In total, between 
1966 and 1970, the level of economic exchange with the capitalist countries rose 
by around one third.6
 Gomułka’s opening up was, however, limited. Despite developing foreign trade, 
the level of exchange with capitalist countries was never intended to come close 
to that with the CMEA members, which were envisaged by the leadership as the 
main receivers of Polish exports and the main pillar of Polish economic develop-
ment.7 During the late 1960s, Poland, alongside Hungary, became a main advo-
cate for a reform of the organisation and further economic integration between the 
socialist states.8 The aversion of Gomułka’s leadership towards engaging closer 
with Western countries was especially apparent in the case of foreign loans. In 
the late 1960s Polish indebtedness was among the lowest in Europe. During a 
meeting devoted to the difficult economic situation in early 1970, Gomułka and 
his closest collaborators fiercely rejected the possibility of taking Western credit, 
motivating this position with the risk of entering a trap of indebtedness or even 
‘walking on the leash of capitalism’.9 Instead, the leadership aimed to improve 
the economic situation through balanced economic exchanges and increasingly 
severe austerity measures. 
The reluctance to expand cooperation with capitalist countries was largely 
determined by unregulated political relations with the Federal Republic of Ger-
many (FRG). The lack of recognition of Poland’s western border on the Oder-
Nyssen line together with tragic memories of the Nazi occupation of Poland 
which were shared not only by the leadership but also the population fuelled the 
official antagonism towards West Germany and consequently Western Europe as 
a whole. Despite the establishment of a trade representation in Cologne in 1963, 
in this period Poland aimed to limit political rapprochement between the social-
ist countries and the FRG.10 Instead, Gomułka lobbied for a security conference 
which would confirm the territorial status quo in Europe and which he considered 
a preliminary condition for European détente.11 
Alongside the unresolved problem of the German border, the hesitance of the 
1960s leadership concerning further expanding East-West cooperation is often 
associated with the first secretary himself, or more broadly with his generation, 
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leadership in the late 1960s was marked by authoritarian methods, a limited 
inflow of challenges to the line he imposed and a concentration of policymaking 
in the small circle of politburo members.12 Furthermore, this group consisted pri-
marily of communists who had been politically trained in the interwar period and 
who were shaped by both the experience of the Second Polish Republic, a state 
economically dependent on the West and classical Marxist thought in which eco-
nomic accumulation was a necessary condition for political independence. They 
therefore remained reluctant to expand contacts with capitalist countries. 
A generational change and a gradual inflow of younger politicians, whose 
political views already originated in socialist Poland, challenged the older com-
munists’ monopoly of power. The events of March 1968, when the anti-Zionist 
narrative of the socialist states related to the Arab-Israeli war was used as a tool 
for party purges, played a major role in this respect. 13 The anti-Semitic campaign 
aimed at older communists of Jewish origin led to the removal of around a third 
of the party and government elite.14 
Moreover, the events of 1968 significantly damaged Gomułka’s authority and 
allowed the rise of alternative factions within the party. The first of these, labelled 
‘partisans’ and defending extreme national views such as strong hostility to West 
Germany, predominantly included party members linked with the secret services, 
most notably Mieczysław Moczar, a former minister of internal affairs. The other 
‘Silesians’ gathered around Gierek, a politburo member widely known for a mod-
ernisation programme he executed as the regional party leader in Silesia. Unlike 
the majority of the socialist elite at the time, Gierek experienced his political 
formation in the communist parties of France and Belgium, where he grew up and 
worked as a miner. 15 His faction mostly attracted the regional PUWP apparatuses 
and the managerial elite. 
The negative attitude of Gierek’s supporters to the leadership in place had its 
source in Gomułka and his closest co-operators’ strategy of ‘selective devel-
opment’ of the late 1960s for the new five-year plan for 1971–75. This policy 
attempted to focus exclusively on a few branches of economic production and 
marginalised others, which naturally resulted in opposition coming from the 
unprivileged sectors. Among other losses, the groups related to these industries 
were supposed to have limited access to new Western technologies, which they 
traditionally demanded.16 Tadeusz Wrzaszczyk, an engineer and the head of the 
Polish automobile industry association ‘Polmo’ in the late 1960s, was the most 
influential representative of these circles and became well known for his lobbying 
for the motorisation of Poland. Gomułka considered cars an unnecessary luxury 
good, contradictory to the very idea of socialism.17 On the contrary, already in the 
late 1960s Gierek openly supported Wrzaszczyk’s proposals. 18 
The question of motorisation became an emblematic battle over visions of the 
regime’s future, attracting not only industrial managers and politicians but also 
experts in the state apparatus, above all in the Planning Commission, and in aca-
demic institutions such as the Main School of Planning and Statistics. Within 
these groups, the most open supporting voice arrived from Józef Pajestka, pro-
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Not only did he advocate mass motorisation and point out its numerous strengths 
for the economy, but he also triggered a debate about the ‘socialist model of con-
sumption’.20 This long-lasting discussion between party-related and more inde-
pendent experts and also professional journalists increasingly revealed growing 
discontent with the economic austerity implemented in the late 1960s, pointing 
to shortages, low quality and the limited offer of accessible supplies. 21 Many 
of the economic experts participating in the debate, including Pajestka himself, 
advocated a policy of intensification of economic growth and technological mod-
ernisation which would move Poland towards a second phase of industrialisation 
in which the quality and modernity of production was expected to replace its 
quantity. 22 The Japanese model of fast modernisation through technology trans-
fers was considered a possible example for Poland.23 Postulates concerning mod-
ernisation, foreign technology and consumption often appeared on the pages of two
weeklies: Polityka (Politics), edited since 1958 by Mieczysław Rakowski; and Życie
i Nowoczesność (Life and Modernity), established in early 1970 and edited by Stefan
Bratkowski. While both editors-in-chief were PUWP members and subject to censor-
ship, their newspapers represented liberal and reformist outlets of the socialist elite.
 Gomułka’s policy was finally challenged by the détente agenda in Western 
Europe. In March 1969, several Western European leaders positively welcomed 
the Budapest Appeal for a European Security Conference issued by the social-
ist states. In September, the results of elections in the FRG brought the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) to power. The new chancellor, Willy Brandt, 
advocated a policy of bringing the two parts of the continent closer and among 
other things started negotiations with the Polish leadership on a bilateral treaty. 
This period witnessed a substantial change in attitudes to the FRG, and as a conse-
quence to Western Europe as a whole, which found reflection in the party’s theo-
retical monthly Nowe Drogi (New Paths). In late 1968 and early 1969, the journal 
still emphasised links between the US and the FRG and evidenced their ‘imperial’
and ‘Cold War’ aims.24 By September 1970 Brandt’s policy was classified as a 
force for peaceful coexistence.25 Although the visible change in the official narra-
tive might be interpreted as an effort to rationalise the ongoing negotiations with 
West Germany, it still signalled a major shift in the ideological framework of the 
Polish socialist regime, which traditionally legitimised itself with the threat of 
German revisionism. In this context, the treaty of 7 December 1970 in which FRG 
accepted Poland’s western border on the Oder-Neisse line was widely recognised 
as a historical breakthrough.26
 Gomułka and his closest collaborators expected this diplomatic success to 
improve their popularity and facilitate the austerity measures they planned to 
introduce a few days later. 27 On 12 December, the leadership increased the prices 
of basic alimentary products, most notably of meat. The decision led to social 
upheavals on a scale previously unseen in Poland’s socialist history. Brutal sup-
pression of workers’ demonstrations in the coastal region executed by the army 
resulted in the dismissal of Gomułka and the appointment of Gierek as PUWP first 
secretary. This course of events, however, remains an object of historical debate. 
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to opinions that he himself triggered the political crisis or that his victory was 
planned in advance in Moscow. 28 In any case, the dismissal of Gomułka and the 
arrival of Gierek might be seen as a reflection not only of political manoeuvring 
but also of ideas present in the party. The choice of him was a victory over other 
agendas popular among the socialist elite, in particular those represented by the 
nationalist “partisan” faction. 
Despite developing foreign trade, Gomułka’s leadership had remained hesitant 
about engaging more closely with capitalist states until the very end. However, the 
last years of the decade brought increasing challenges to the official policy arriv-
ing from the evolving international situation and from different groups among the 
socialist elite. Many arguments raised during that period signalled the direction of 
upcoming changes in the early 1970s. 
A new ambitious strategy, 1971–72 
In addition to the new first secretary, replacements of personnel in the party and 
the government took place which continued the generational change in the leader-
ship initiated in 1968. In total, in 1971 ten of the sixteen members of the politburo 
lost their positions, as did half of the ministers and presidents of commissions in 
the government, in what has been labelled a ‘revolutionary’ reshuffle. 29 
However, while the manner and speed of personnel replacements might have 
had a revolutionary character, they did not foreshadow a revolutionary change in 
the political line. Despite the removal of Gomułka and his closest collaborators, 
still around half of the leadership, including Gierek, had been part of the previous 
cohort. This was also the case of the new prime minister, Piotr Jaroszewicz, who 
held this position throughout the 1970s. As vice prime minister and Polish repre-
sentative to the CMEA for many years, Jaroszewicz was definitely not new to the 
socialist leadership. Similarly, Stefan Jędrychowski, a member of the government 
since 1945 and of the politburo since 1954, kept his position in the main decision-
making bodies, first as minister of foreign affairs and after 1972 as minister of 
finance, as did Wojciech Jaruzelski, who had been active in the Polish army 
since the Second World War and became its general in 1956 and was minister of 
national defence and a member of the politburo throughout the 1970s. Although 
in 1971 Gierek marginalised Moczar within the leadership, many of his associates 
remained in place and acquired new positions. For instance, Franciszek Szlachcic, 
who was very influential in secret-service circles, joined the new politburo while 
Stefan Olszowski took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late 1971. The com-
mon characteristic of the majority of the newly promoted party and government 
members, including both those mentioned earlier, was their political training in 
the Union of Polish Youth, a formation inspired by the Soviet Komsomol which 
existed in the Stalinist period. Resulting from this education, younger members of 
the leadership often presented highly ideological attitudes. 
Nonetheless, Western governments and media quickly labelled the new Polish 
leadership ‘technocratic’.30 Indeed, the renewed composition of the key political 
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Among others, this was the case of Wrzaszczyk, the new minister of machinery 
industry; Tadeusz Olechowski, who became minister of foreign trade after over 
twenty years of a professional career in foreign trade ventures and trade represen-
tations; Henryk Kisiel, who after serving at the National Bank for over twenty-
five years first led the Trade Bank and then became minister of finance in the 
1970s; and Pajestka, who had a position in the Planning Commission. 
The professionalisation of the leadership was accompanied by institutional 
change. Already in January 1971, the politburo issued a document regarding 
a need for increased parliamentary activity. 31 This very early decision laid the 
ground for a rise in the government’s influence, especially over economic matters, 
eventually marginalising the party apparatus in this respect. Given the overlap 
between the politburo and government members, at first glance this change might 
not appear relevant. Indeed, throughout the decade over a half of the politburo 
members also held ministerial positions. The leading role of the government, 
however, allowed the rise of people who had never pursued careers in the party 
structures, like Wrzaszczyk. The increase in government influence also meant 
a growth in the independence of particular ministries. Already in the first years 
of the 1970s, many of them officially widened their competences and therefore 
secured broader autonomy from the centre.32 
Apart from improving existing institutions, the leadership aimed to establish 
new ones. In February 1971, the politburo decided to create a Commission for the 
Modernisation of the Economy and State Functioning – Szydlak’s Commission, 
named after its supervisor, Jan Szydlak, one of Gierek’s closest co-operators from 
Silesia. Over two hundred politicians, experts and professionals were gathered 
in ten different sections of the body to provide the party and government with 
effective solutions to tackle the most pressing problems. Also in 1971, for the 
first time in Polish socialist history the first secretary named a personal advisor. 
Zdzisław Rurarz was a graduate from the Main School of Planning and Statistics 
and a former employee of the Ministry of Foreign Trade with impressive interna-
tional experience, including a career in Polish representation at Geneva dealing 
with the GATT and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). 
As is often stressed in testimonies from the decade, the new first secretary did 
not bring any ready-made programme but worked out a plan during his first year 
in power. 33 In this context, the increasing involvement of broader groups of the 
socialist elite became critical for the new agenda. Nevertheless, Polish histogra-
phy often dismisses the technocratic character of policymaking in the 1970s.34 
However, when compared with other socialist states such as Bulgaria and Hun-
gary, where power was still concentrated in the hands of older generation com-
munists, the new leadership and its governing methods stand out as unique.35 
The new management model was expected to improve the domestic situation and 
enable the successful implementation of a new agenda despite the principal ideo-
logical and personal continuities. 
Already on 19 December, Gierek communicated a shift in economic strategy 
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following day, the politburo decided to increase salaries and social benefits. These 
immediate actions were followed in January by a price freeze to the same level 
as before the 1970 rise. Further development of this agenda took place over the 
following year and resulted in a radical revision of the five-year plan for 1971– 
75 prepared by the previous leadership. Doubling the figures in the previous 
version, the new plan envisaged a rise in salaries of 18% and a 40% growth in 
consumption.36 
Scholars usually see these decisions as an immediate response to the crisis 
and a means of securing social stability. 37 While this logic undoubtedly drove 
the immediate reactions and above all the cancellation of the price rise, it fails to 
explain the model of consumption proposed by the new leadership. Rather than 
efficiently improving the accessibility of foodstuff, as the protesters demanded 
in December 1970, the new five-year plan focused on enriching the supply of 
more sophisticated consumer goods, including electronics and machinery, thus 
responding to the postulates raised by experts in the late 1960s. Already in Febru-
ary 1971, the leadership started to explore the possibility of purchasing a licence 
to produce a widely accessible personal car, which materialised in a deal with 
Italian Fiat signed later in the year. Purchases of licences for many other consumer 
products including tape recorders, buses and colour TV sets followed. Given that 
the country was slowly emerging from economic turmoil, the decisions to initiate 
complex production and increase imports of machinery appear bold rather than 
necessary. 
Moreover, the new model of consumption went further than improving the 
accessibility of goods. For example, the renewed five-year plan proposed a 17% 
rise in expenditure on tourism, leisure and sport.38 Already in 1972, the leader-
ship introduced the first free Saturdays and the annual number of them rose sys-
tematically through the decade.39 The proposed model of life based on leisure, 
free time and the widespread accessibility of consumer products differed from 
that of the 1960s. As Rurarz recalls, he suggested to Gierek that he should call 
this programme a new official socialist doctrine of ‘mass consumption’. The first 
secretary, however, objected to the proposal for ideological reasons. 40 Although 
since the 24th Congress of the CPSU the Soviet leadership had also aimed to 
improve the quality of life, it still regarded the concept of consumption as a capi-
talist state perversion. According to Rurarz, an article he wrote for  Nowe Drogi, 
in which he praised the new consumption model, caused significant controversy 
among Soviet officials, who became sceptical about his advisory role to the first 
secretary. 41 In the article, he stated among other things that ‘cars and comfortable 
apartments will become accessible for everyone. . . . To the mass tourism of those 
[Western] societies we will reply with our mass tourism’. 42 
Alongside improving the quality of life, the new leadership aimed to inten-
sify economic growth and thus fulfil the ideological requirements of the socialist
regimes concerning continual industrialisation. The revised five-year plan increased
the envisaged 6% annual growth to 9%.43 The document also dismissed the proposal
for ‘selective development’ from the 1960s, instead introducing balanced growth
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the leadership initiated new investments in heavy industry. The most spectacular
ones were in the Katowice Steelworks and the Gdańsk Refinery, both launched in
1971. Moreover, the government encouraged both new and more traditional indus-
tries to look for modern technology abroad.44 The five-year plan named imports
of Western technology one of the principal pillars of the new programme and rec-
ommended using licences to establish more long-term cooperation agreements
with Western companies. The document assessed that the lack of ties with foreign
industries had often limited Poland’s production ability and recommended dou-
bling expenditure on this kind of agreements.45 The impetus of the modernisation
programme of the early 1970s stimulated comparisons with the demanding first
six-year plan implemented after the Second World War. 46 Moreover, the Japanese
development model based on technology imports and intensified economic growth,
which was praised by experts already in the late Gomułka period, explicitly reso-
nated in official documents from the early 1970s. 47 
While the new leadership responded to pressures from regional PUWP appa-
ratuses and the managerial elite securing the internal cohesion of the party, its 
proposals concerning intensified economic growth carried many risks. Combin-
ing intensified economic growth with a similarly ambitious rise in consumption 
violated the assumptions of the socialist economy, which regarded the simultane-
ous development of both as exclusive. Moreover, the experience of the previous 
decades spoke against exaggerated economic goals. The new plan also openly 
encouraged closer links with companies in the capitalist countries, disregarding 
the possibility of dependency on Western industries. Finally, in the post-crisis 
reality Polish accumulated capital was not sufficient to achieve these ambitious 
aims. From early 1971 onwards, it was clear that the new strategy critically 
depended on foreign loans. 
The politburo explored Western credit opportunities immediately. 48 The new 
economic plan for 1971–75 was initially expected to allow Poland to extend its 
debt to 9 billion exchange złotys – over twice as much as was proposed in the 
late 1960s. A strong preference was given to investment credits, but consumption 
credits were also acceptable from 1971 onwards.49 This policy encountered an 
especially strong backlash from the highly positioned members of the previous 
leadership, including Gomułka himself, who in an emotional letter to the PUWP
Central Committee blamed the new leadership for ‘eating from someone else’s 
plate’.50 On the other hand, according to testimony from Piotr Kostikow, head of 
the Polish department in the Central Committee of the CPSU, Moscow not only 
allowed but recommended the Polish leadership to look for credit opportunities 
in the West. 51 Undoubtedly, in the early years of the decade the Polish leadership 
informed Moscow about its economic plans concerning credits and regularly con-
sulted on its political choices.52 
Given the scale of the envisaged debt, long-term repayment schedules and the 
launch of costly new investments, the success of the new economic agenda was 
conditioned on efficient trade with the capitalist countries. The new five-year 
plan forecast a 57% increase in foreign trade volume, including 55% in exports.53 
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but also surprising given the experience of unfulfilled export promises in previous 
economic plans.54 
While expecting an improvement in economic performance, the new agenda 
did not entail significant systemic reforms. As already mentioned, the newly 
established Commission for the Modernisation of the Economy and State Func-
tioning was expected to propose more general changes in this respect. Its activity 
was, however, ideologically limited. As Szydlak, the head of the Commission, 
stated during a meeting, ‘First of all, we will not be making any noise, any pro-
paganda noise. As you all well know, comrades, we are under constant fire, both 
from within the country and from the outside, so we will not make any noise. 
Economic reforms are the least suited to propaganda noise’.55 According to testi-
monies from the decade, ideological concerns constrained implementing propos-
als from the Commission.56 Similarly, the idea of fashioning the Polish economic 
system on the Hungarian or Yugoslavian models, which had supporters among the 
socialist elite, remained at the level of unofficial debates. 57 In the aftermath of the 
suppression of the Prague Spring and the rise of the Brezhnev doctrine, reform of 
the system became a taboo for the Warsaw Pact members. 58 
Members of the leadership were well aware of the bold character of the new 
agenda. As Jaroszewicz framed it when referring to the new economic plan: ‘We 
have to conclude that the plan is not smooth and easy. It is bold and ambitious 
and contains many difficulties and risks’. 59 During discussion on how to present 
the new agenda to society, Stanisław Trepczyński, a diplomat, highlighted that ‘a 
big novelty is the vision of our industrial modernisation on a scale unseen before. 
This includes the question of foreign debt and licenses and other things which 
used to be a deadly sin to think of, and we are not afraid of them’.60 Interestingly, 
the ambition and confidence underlying the new economic strategy were also 
expected to serve as a means of mobilising society and improving the popularity 
of the socialist elite. This logic stood behind famous propaganda slogans, such as 
‘Poland, the 10th global industrial power’ and ‘We are building a second Poland’, 
which originated in that period.61 
A bold international agenda accompanied the new five-year plan. The new guide-
lines for foreign policy expected Poland to become the most influential socialist state
in Europe after the Soviet Union. The document considered Europe as a primary
field of Polish diplomatic activity, identified the EEC as an important new actor
in European politics and recommended expanding contacts with the body as well
as improving the institutional apparatus working on integration processes. It also
envisaged Poland having a critical role in shaping the CSCE.62 The list of the first
secretary’s planned travels and visits by politicians to Poland reflected the launch of
a new diplomatic offensive. 63 Apart from traditional channels, documents from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs conceptualised economic relations as an integral part of
foreign policy, describing them as a means of ‘making détente irreversible’. 64 
In view of the traditional hostility between socialist and capitalist countries, 
the choices in the early years of the decade not only signalled the boldness of the 
leadership but also reflected the evolving perception of the international situation. 
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after its ratification by the Bundestag in May 1972, antagonism towards West 
Germany gradually disappeared from propaganda and foreign policy. 65 More-
over, official documents and academic publications associated Western European 
integration with a trend towards European ‘emancipation from American hege-
mony’.66 The ongoing talks preceding the CSCE, together with the increasing 
role of social democratic parties in Western European states, further fuelled the 
positive perception of the region as opposed to the US.67 In this context, from the 
early 1970s not only the popular press and PUWP journals but also some official 
documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs started to refer to the Cold War as a 
phenomenon of the past, proclaiming a new era of peaceful coexistence whereby 
the superiority of one system over the other would be decided by its attractive-
ness.68 Similarly, in academic party-related writings, the period between the end 
of the Second World War and the Polish-FRG treaty was depicted and historicised 
as a ‘Cold War’. 69 In an interview with Gierek published in 1990, the first sec-
retary himself confirmed that at the time he ‘bet on the end of the Cold War’. 70 
The strong confidence in the attractiveness and success of the renewed domestic 
economic agenda and of the durability of détente in Europe allowed the leadership 
to introduce significant cultural liberalisation in the early 1970s. An immediate 
improvement in the traditionally problematic relationship between the PUWP
and the Catholic Church became emblematic of the new approach.71 Moreover, 
already in the first years of the decade, authors and artists banned from present-
ing their work publicly by the censorship received rehabilitation. An inflow of 
Western culture followed, including publications, films, arts and music. Also, the 
leadership substantially liberalised the passport policy and created a fund allow-
ing Polish citizens to exchange a limited amount of domestic currency against 
foreign currencies at the official beneficial rate. This decision opened the door 
to an unprecedented number of visits to Western countries, which tripled within 
five years compared to 1971.72 Except for Yugoslavia, which was known for its 
openness and broader individual freedoms, no socialist regime experienced such 
a cultural liberalisation in the détente period. The decisions enabling the inflow of 
Western culture and visits to the West are evidence not only of the belief that the 
system could stand up to domestic challenges but also that it could successfully 
sustain comparison with capitalism. 
The Gierek leadership’s first plan largely responded to the questions raised by 
different groups in the socialist elite already in the late 1960s. The new leadership 
took into consideration the demands of regional party apparatuses, the managerial 
elite and experts and lastingly increased the influence of these groups in poli-
cymaking, securing a unity of the socialist elite in a period of a shift in national 
strategy. The new technocratic approach and détente, which was assumed to be 
the permanent condition of international relations, drove the ambition underlying 
the new agenda for complex cooperation with the West. 
External and domestic challenges, 1973–76 
The 1970s are often referred to as a belle époque in socialist Poland’s history. 73 
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witnessed consistently rising wages and a substantial increase in consumption, 
which contributed to securing domestic stability. The policy of large investments 
also allowed accommodation of the children of the post-war demographic boom, 
who entered the job market during this period. Moreover, in 1975 the volume of 
foreign trade with capitalist countries tripled compared to 1970, fulfilling lead-
ership’s expectations from the beginning of the decade. 74 However, it quickly 
became apparent that while imports rose, exports remained quite modest, which 
made the repayment of loans more and more burdensome. Polish indebtedness in 
1975 is estimated at around $11 billion. At the same time, however, the economic 
plan drawn up in 1971 foresaw that the ‘investment harvest’ would only come in
the second half of the decade when all the new factories would start producing.75 
The honeymoon in political relations with Western Europe accompanied prom-
ising results in the domestic economy. Gierek’s command of French and German 
soon enabled him to establish personal relations with Western leaders and, along-
side Nicolae Ceaușescu, pursue a ‘policy of prestige’.76 The diplomatic renewal 
was marked by numerous visits, such as trips by the first secretary to Paris in 
1972, Brussels in 1973 and Bonn in 1975. Likewise, Western leaders including 
Richard Nixon, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and others visited Poland during that 
period. Preparation for the CSCE additionally drove the explosion of contacts 
with Western politicians. The first secretary’s international activity brought an 
unprecedented quality change in official relations with Western partners and 
improved his domestic image.77 The press widely described Gierek’s international 
travels, portraying him as an influential global leader. 78 
These results in economic and foreign relations fuelled confidence in the early 
1970s. As is pointed out in testimonies from the decade, the leadership was over-
whelmed and surprised by its own success.79 Positive assessment of the new policy 
also found reflection in support from the PUWP, which between 1970 and 1980 
acquired 700,000 new members, reaching its maximum size, involving around 
12% of the Polish population. This perception was also shared by both Eastern 
and Western observers. As Kostikow recalled, more and more people talked about 
a Polish ‘economic miracle’.80 Similarly, Western states competed for lucrative 
business opportunities in Poland, debating whether Gierek had found a ‘magic 
key which unlocked the door to efficiency’. 81 In the circumstances of internal and 
external enthusiasm, the leadership did not perceive a revision of its strategy to 
be necessary. 
At the same time, international developments in the 1970s accelerated Polish 
cooperation with the West. While Poland praised the Western European states for 
increasing their independence from the US, their proceeding integration posed a 
significant economic challenge for Poland. Unlike exporters of natural resources 
such as the Soviet Union and Romania, Polish exports to Western Europe con-
sisted above all of agricultural products, the access of which to the EEC market 
was already limited in the 1960s with the introduction of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). The enlargement of the Community to the UK, Poland’s second 
biggest trading partner in the West, challenged Poland’s export ability in 1973. 
The most important threat, however, concerned the Common Commercial Policy 
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could no longer be negotiated and signed with Western European states but had 
to be agreed with the European Commission instead. The EEC’s intensified inte-
gration process clashed with Polish plans in the early 1970s based on large-scale 
exchanges and a vision of Pan-European cooperation. 
In these circumstances, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade, two institutions primarily concerned with the EEC, responded 
by expanding the institutional apparatus monitoring developments in Western 
Europe, for instance by establishing a special unit in the Polish embassy in Brus-
sels.82 The general CMEA policy of non-recognition of the EEC, however, limited 
the actions of such institutions. In the period of increasing Western European 
integration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
associated experts became a source of pressure on the politburo and the govern-
ment to regulate the relationship with the Community. 83 
Unwilling to depart from the unified socialist front, while lobbying alongside 
Hungary in Moscow for recognition of the EEC, the Polish leadership aimed 
instead at means to overcome the challenges posed by EEC integration, par-
ticularly before the introduction of the CCP in 1975. 84 As a consequence, the 
guidelines for Polish foreign policy assumed: ‘Our goal is to maintain, as long as 
possible, bilateral relations with the EEC states, not allowing any interference by 
the Commission. In the short term, we should take advantage of these relations to 
mitigate harmful restrictive and discriminatory practices.’85 Following this direc-
tion, Poland concluded economic agreements with eight out of nine members of 
the EEC before 1975, some for the first time since the Second World War. More-
over, looking for an alternative to the regional integration in Western Europe and 
for a space for interaction with the representatives of the officially unrecognised 
European Commission, Poland intensified its activity in international organisa-
tions, above all in the GATT and the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe (ECE). The Polish leadership aimed for as many economic gains as pos-
sible before the further closure of the EEC markets. Although the EEC never 
planned to unify the terms of credits, reports from the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
suggested: ‘We should expect that the EEC will aim to unify the terms of invest-
ment credits for socialist states, especially after 1974. We should take advantage 
of the time separating us from this moment to get indebted as much as possible 
with the EEC member states.’86 A similar recommendation concerned establish-
ing as many long-term cooperation agreements as possible, which if signed before 
the introduction of the CCP could still function on the terms in the original con-
tracts.87 This strategy of bypassing the EEC, however, often reached a dead end 
and direct unofficial contacts with representatives of the European Commission 
became inevitable. In the first half of the 1970s, alongside Hungary and Romania, 
Poland became a frontrunner in such practices among the CMEA members. 88 
Inflation in capitalist countries in the early 1970s, fuelled by the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system and a stock market crash resulting from the oil embargo 
proclaimed by Arab petroleum countries in 1973, similarly accelerated Poland’s 
engagement with the West. The leadership welcomed the difficulties of the capi-
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real prices of instalments are lower than initially assumed’, and pushed for as 
many loans as possible.89 Poland’s position as a coal exporter only encouraged 
its confidence in its ability to take advantage of the turmoil in global resources.90 
At the same time, the problem of energy supplies put Poland in a disadvan-
tageous position with regard to the other socialist states. As the key producer 
of coal, it was obliged to sell more to the CMEA countries at set unfavourable 
prices.91 This concern caused increasing scepticism over socialist economic inte-
gration, which in that period was also emerging over the unreformed model of 
economic exchanges still based on transferable roubles, which meant that Polish 
goods, which were often based on expensive foreign technology and contained 
parts imported from the West using hard currency, were sold for prices not cor-
responding to the production costs. This situation naturally led to privileging the 
West as a trading partner. 
However, the oil crisis had another effect on Polish national strategy in the 
1970s. Reports from the Planning Commission assumed the difficulties of the 
capitalist countries to be the reason behind insufficient Polish export revenues. 92 
This argument was often used by Jaroszewicz when justifying his commitment to 
the economic agenda of the early 1970s. According to this logic, the moment the 
international economic situation improved, Polish trade exchanges would bring 
the expected results.93 In this sense, the oil crisis not only speeded up Poland’s 
opening towards the West but also blurred the picture of the domestic economic 
situation. 
Not everyone in the new leadership, however, shared the mainstream interpre-
tation of ‘beneficial momentum’ with regard to the first half of the 1970s. Reports 
produced by Minister of National Defence Jaruzelski warned against a positive 
assessment of Western Europe and the building of economic ties with the EEC 
states, recalling the continued existence of security dangers.94 Similarly, some 
reports from the Planning Commission in 1974 advised a cut in expenditure and 
an economising of resources given the prospect of economic slowdown in global 
markets as a consequence of the oil crisis.95 Minister of Finance Jędrychowski 
also insisted on a reversal of the economic strategy, which drove him into conflict 
with Jaroszewicz and resulted in his dismissal from the government in 1974.96 
The same trajectory was followed by Szlachcic, who openly warned the politburo 
against ‘idealising credits’ and ‘slithering towards the West’. 97 He lost his influ-
ence soon afterwards and was removed from the leadership in 1975.98 
Criticism of the official policy was also the reason behind the removal in 1973 
of the original editorial board of the weekly Life and Modernity, which since 
early 1970 had consisted of members of the liberal side of the socialist elite and 
economic experts advocating reforms and modernisation. Moreover, already in 
late 1972, Rurarz, Gierek’s personal advisor, resigned from his position and trans-
ferred back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In his own assessment, this change 
was motivated by profound disagreement over the economic choices made by the 
leadership.99 He was quickly replaced with Paweł Bożyk, a professor at the Main 
School of Planning and Statistics and, like his predecessor, a specialist in foreign 
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The mid-1970s also witnessed a decline of the Commission for the Modernisa-
tion of the Economy and State Functioning. While the majority of the proposals 
prepared by this institution remained unimplemented, the government estab-
lished Huge Economic Units (WOG) in 1973 following a recommendation by 
the Commission. The new entities enjoyed unprecedently wide prerogatives. Not 
only were they exempt from the obligation to follow the central plan closely, but 
they could also decide on foreign trade deals and in some cases on the prices of 
goods produced.100 The reform contributed to the general trend of widening the 
competences of specific ministries and industries initiated after Gierek’s arrival 
in power, which made the coordination ability of the central institutions looser. 
Moreover, each industry and ministry behind it was primarily concerned with its 
own interests and constantly sought funding for new investments. The activity of 
Wrzaszczyk, the highly influential minister of machinery industry, best illustrates 
these practices, which were labelled ‘investment pressure’.101 Even though many 
of the newly initiated productions, such as the Fiat, turned out to be much costlier 
than initially assumed, he always successfully persuaded the rest of the leadership 
to provide more funds and launch further investments.102 
Already before his removal, Szlachcic drew attention to the loss of coordination
over the rising economic engagement with the West, above all credit-taking. 103 
Ensuing efforts to increase party and government control over the matter, however,
did not prevent a growing concern in the Soviet Union over the economic situation
in Poland.104 Signs of the Soviet preoccupation are often recalled in memoirs by 
the policymakers of the decade.105 They also find illustration in the leadership’s 
actions aiming to obscure the cooperation with the West, for instance by cover-
ing up official statistics which indicated that the level of economic exchange with 
capitalist countries already overtook that with the CMEA around 1975. 106 The 
Soviet Union’s growing concern explains Gierek’s symbolical gestures of subordi-
nation, which multiplied in that period. In 1974 the first secretary honoured Leonid
Brezhnev with the Virtuti Militari, the highest Polish military award. Moreover, 
a year later he announced plans to incorporate into the constitution a new article 
proclaiming a timeless alliance with the Soviet Union. 
These actions triggered the unification of the opposition-minded intellectu-
als, who in early 1976 issued a ‘Letter of 59’ protesting against changes in the 
constitution and calling for respect for citizens’ rights. The signatories directly 
referred to the Final Act of the CSCE signed in Helsinki in August 1975, which 
acknowledged these prerogatives. The leadership strongly condemned the protest 
and accordingly proceeded with its initial plans despite the objections raised. 
In late 1975, alongside revising the constitution the government launched work
on the new economic plan for 1976–80. Driven by Poland’s positive achieve-
ments and regardless of the increasing domestic scepticism and worrying external
developments, the document predicted a boom in exports and modern high-quality
production and therefore established intensified growth and improvement in the 
quality of life as the main economic goals for the following five years.107 Similarly,
with the peak of European détente marked by the CSCE Final Act, the leadership 
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of economic policy, the guidelines for foreign policy for 1976 remained largely 
untouched.108 
Securing the status quo, 1976–80 
The second half of the 1970s brought to the fore the previously marginalised 
negative outcomes of Gierek’s policy. The existing price freeze combined with 
rising wages, which in 1976 were double those of 1970, resulted in repeated short-
ages and often made it necessary to import basic agricultural products from the 
West. Aiming to restore equilibrium, in June 1976 Jaroszewicz announced price 
rises. Gierek is reported to have expected that the population would support the 
leadership and its agenda and understand the necessity of the decision.109 Instead, 
the new prices triggered mass protests, especially in Radom and Ursus, where 
the police brutally intervened, injuring some of the participants. This negative 
reaction resulted in an immediate cancellation of the decision.110 Social stability 
had been one of the key features of the early 1970s, and the leadership wanted to 
secure it at any price. 
An alarming report issued after these events by the Planning Commission in 
cooperation with Bożyk exposed the state of the Polish economy. It revealed 
expenditure was around 20% higher than income and that the debts accumulated 
over the previous years already consumed 44% of export revenue, a figure that 
would probably rise to more than 60% in the next two years. It stated that exports 
were often rejected due to their disappointing quality and were growing insuffi-
ciently, while imports, which were necessary for continuing production in many 
sectors, were rising rapidly. The authors firmly recommended drastically cutting 
the number of new investments, improving centralised control and accelerating 
exports.111 These recommendations laid the ground for a revision of the draft 
five-year plan prepared in 1975, which was labelled an ‘economic manoeuvre’. 
By slowing down the negative trends, the leadership aimed to put the original 
agenda on hold rather than drastically reversing it. This strategy, based on the 
hope of a sudden improvement in Polish performance, continued until the end 
of the decade. 
However, even the limited changes in economic policy quickly proved difficult 
to implement in practice. The ‘open plan’ idea aiming to improve the leadership’s 
flexibility in reality only facilitated unforeseen expenditure. Moreover, a partial 
cancellation of the WOG reform in 1976, which was part of the programme to 
reinforce central control, did not put an end to ‘investment pressure’. Represen-
tatives of the managerial elite still often managed to successfully persuade the 
leadership to grant more funds.112 Preserving the unity of the socialist elite by 
avoiding discontentment among these groups became another feature of the pol-
icy to maintain the status quo. 
The continuation of exchanges with the West was critical to maintain the 
favourable situation of the early 1970s, and the leadership interpreted interna-
tional developments as not foreshadowing any change. Elections in the FRG 
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reversal of Ostpolitik. Moreover, despite increasing awareness among the West-
ern states and banks about the real state of the Polish economy after the 1976 
crisis, foreign loans continued to flow in to Poland.113 These developments con-
firming the durability of détente enabled and encouraged the Polish leadership’s 
passive policy in the second half of the 1970s. 
At the same time, however, its actions following the price rises contributed to 
a deterioration in East-West relations. Despite the fact that the scale of repres-
sion in 1976 was much less severe than in 1970, it substantially undermined the 
peaceful image of the leadership. The persecution of demonstration participants, 
which included lay-offs and imprisonment, raised the attention of the opposition-
minded intellectuals who had already been active on the occasion of the ‘Let-
ter of 59’. A Workers Defence Committee (KOR) was officially established in
September 1976 with the aim of supporting the families harmed by the repres-
sion both financially and legally. This continually growing group and others that 
originated in that period became permanent actors on the political landscape in 
the second half of the 1970s.114 Although only the US officially linked the stream 
of loans with respect for human rights, Western European politicians also regu-
larly inquired about the KOR and the situation of dissidents.115 Fearing an end of 
détente and economic exchanges with the West, policymakers tolerated the dis-
sident activity. 116 As Rakowski stated in his memoirs, ‘A few words from Giscard 
d’Estaing . . . would be enough to let everyone out of prison’.117 
The events of 1976 and the following rise of the dissident movement triggered 
concerns not only in the West but also in the East. As memoirs of the decade recall, 
the Soviet Union frequently urged the Polish leadership to regulate the domestic 
economic and political situation.118 In addition, the other socialist states became 
anxious about possible contagion by the Polish situation and annoyed about often 
unfulfilled export promises.119 As a result, from 1976 the Soviet Union increased 
its scrutiny of the socialist regimes.120 The rising concern and involvement of 
Western and Eastern actors limited the independence of the Polish leadership, 
confirming its passivity. 
The external developments further harmed Poland’s economic situation. After 
the implementation of the CCP, the EEC introduced new regulations negatively 
impacting Poland’s steel exports and its access to fisheries in the Baltic Sea. 121 In 
addition, the continuing slowdown of the international economy caused by the oil 
crisis limited the access of Polish exports to Western markets. Against the expec-
tations of the mid-1970s, the cost of servicing foreign debt increased as a result 
of Western countries defending their currencies with high interest rates. 122 More-
over, many energy-intensive Polish industries experienced unforeseen costs as a 
consequence of energy price rises, especially after the oil crisis in 1979 caused 
by the Iranian revolution. If that was not enough, in the second half of the decade 
Poland suffered adverse meteorological conditions. In particular in 1979, a “win-
ter of the century” and a devastating drought during the summer resulted in agri-
cultural difficulties and unexpected energy consumption. 
These developments and the lack of decisive action by the Polish leadership 
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everyday life and burdensome shortages, the suspension of many investments 
resulted in massive depreciation. Meanwhile the debts kept rising and reached 
over $20 billion in 1979, which made Poland the most indebted socialist state in 
Europe. In these circumstances, Polish economic problems were ‘on the lips of all 
the [PUWP] members’.123 A rise in Cold War tensions due to the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan in December 1979 fuelled and polarised internal debates. 
On the one hand, the economic crisis pushed Poland closer to the Soviet Union, 
which to some members of the socialist elite appeared as the only remedy to the 
situation. This group included the former minister of foreign affairs, Olszowski, 
who according to Rakowski’s journals already stated in 1976 that ‘in order to leave 
the crisis we need to rely on Moscow. There is no other choice’.124 Jaruzelski and 
Stanisław Kania, the politburo member responsible for the security services, also 
shared this view. Together with Olszowski, they became the strongest opponents 
of Gierek’s policy and the most prominent candidates to replace him. 125 However, 
Moscow signalled to Polish interlocutors that the idea of a ‘Soviet umbrella’ over 
the Polish economy was misplaced.126 Soviet engagement in Afghanistan only 
lowered the chance of it providing economic support. 
Meanwhile, expert bodies suggested a more profound reform of the system, an 
improvement of export capacity and an easing of the increasingly burdensome 
loan instalments through cooperation with Western institutions. Reports issued 
by the team of experts gathered by Bożyk unequivocally insisted on joining the 
IMF and the World Bank. 127 Similarly, bankers and representatives of the Ministry 
of Finance, who in this period acquired unprecedented importance as they were 
at the forefront of securing Polish economic stability, advocated the solution of 
negotiations with creditors and participation in Western economic institutions. 128 
Experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including Rurarz, who since the 
early 1970s had called for regulation of the relationship with the EEC, in this 
period explicitly emphasised the positive economic and political consequences 
that could flow from recognition of the organisation. 129 Despite these recommen-
dations, both joining the IMF and the World Bank and establishing official rela-
tions with the EEC remained impossible due to the position of Moscow. 130 
Despite the pressure, the leadership, which was increasingly concentrated in 
small group around the first secretary, still hoped to continue balancing between 
the West and the East and to handle the crisis independently. While a meeting 
between Giscard d’Estaing and Brezhnev in Warsaw in May 1980 aimed to pre-
serve the favourable international circumstances, a rise in the prices of basic ali-
mentary products in June was the last attempt to cure the Polish economy. 
The decision triggered massive strikes, especially in the coastal region, which 
eventually led to the creation of the independent self-governing labour union 
Solidarity and an unprecedented rise of civil society. While the price rise was 
the spark for the protest, historiography concerning the origins of the phenom-
enon shows longer structural developments. Despite the daily worsening of the 
economic situation, propaganda continually proclaimed spectacular successes, 
which contributed to the frustration in society. 131 Moreover, in 1978 Polish Car-
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became a symbol of the strength of the Polish church and an important counter 
authority to the socialist leadership. His official visit to Poland in 1979 played a 
major role in the mass mobilisation.132 Finally, scholars studying Solidarity also 
agree on the paramount importance of the economic agenda established in the 
early 1970s. The new consumption model elevated social expectations which 
were still unfulfilled in the late 1970s, more prevalent visits to the West brought 
frustration with domestic living standards and liberalisation created space for the 
rise of alternative culture centres and organisations; all jointly paved the way for 
the rise of civil society. 133 
The 1970s ended with a consolidation of workers, the church and the opposition, 
and the PUWP experienced a profound crisis. Already in early 1980, Jaroszewicz 
lost his position, being blamed for the economic decline. Facing mass protests 
in the summer of the same year, the vulnerable leadership agreed to twenty-one 
demands formulated by Solidarity, thereby confirming its legal existence. The 
event triggered the replacement of Gierek and his closest collaborators such as 
Wrzaszczyk and Szydlak. Kania acquired the first secretary position, acting (as 
is often stressed) under the influence of Jaruzelski, who took over the prime min-
ister’s office in early 1981 and after a few months became head of the PUWP. 
After a party convention in July 1981, only four previous members remained in 
the politburo and none of the ministers from Jaroszewicz’s government secured 
their positions. The critical economic situation also affected the regional party 
apparatuses and the managerial elite, preventing these groups from initiating new 
investments or even modernising and completing old ones. Similarly, widely mar-
ginalised leading experts retreated from political life to academia, as in the case of 
Pajestka; emigrated to the West, as in the case of Rurarz; or joined the opposition, 
as in the case of Bratkowski. Between 1980 and 1981, a period described as the 
“carnival of Solidarity”, over 300,000 members officially left the PUWP. 
The events in Poland in 1980 caused not only an internal crisis among the 
socialist elite but also a deterioration in Polish relations with both the East and 
the West. On the one hand, since the rise of Solidarity a threat of a Warsaw Pact 
intervention in Poland hung over the PUWP leadership. On the other hand, from 
the Western European perspective, the consolidation of the opposition challenged 
the policy of close cooperation with the socialist leadership. From the summer of 
1980, Western states maintained relations with both the official Polish representa-
tives and the opposition, regarding Poland as the ‘sick man of the socialist bloc’
which could be used to undermine socialist unity. 134 The tragic financial situation 
resulted in the launch of multilateral talks concerning rescheduling Polish debts in 
Paris and London clubs gathering the creditors. Facing these institutions in March 
1981, Polish representatives declared that the country was insolvent.135 
The new circumstances terminated the peaceful coexistence as envisaged by 
the Polish leadership in the early 1970s and put a radically polarised choice in 
front of Poland. The introduction of martial law in 1981 epitomised a short turn 
towards the East, which hardly helped the domestic situation. Economic support 
from Moscow was limited, and the suspension of foreign debt repayments further 
aggravated the economic situation. The socialist elite was left in no doubt that the 
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 Conclusions 
The ambition of the leadership in the early years of the 1970s plays a paramount 
role in understanding of the subsequent developments in socialist Poland. In fact, 
the scale of the confidence underlying the agenda at the beginning of the decade 
was in proportion to the scale of the crisis which ended it. In the early 1980s, 
unlike in the late 1960s, the accelerating problems could hardly be resolved with 
personnel replacements in the party and the government. Poland’s dependence 
on both the West and the East and the rise of civil society permanently limited 
leadership’s room for independent manoeuvre. Moreover, the socialist elite never 
recovered from internal decomposition caused not only by the bankruptcy of the 
regime and the rise of alternative authorities but also by increasingly diversified 
views and declining confidence. Frequent personnel reshufflings characterised the 
leadership in the 1980s. Moreover, socialist Poland never pursued such an ambi-
tious economic and foreign strategy again. Gierek’s leadership was the last one 
to believe that the system could experience revival without profound economic 
reforms implying marketisation and moving further away from the Soviet model. 
In comparison with the other socialist regimes, the Polish strategy in the 1970s 
had some important particularities. The significant cultural liberalisation and the 
tolerance of dissident activity in the second half of the decade had no equivalent 
in the other socialist countries. At the same time, the Polish trajectory in the 1970s 
shares some important similarities with the GDR and Hungary, where the ruling 
elites also focused on rising living standards and consumption. All three – Hungary 
with its special economic system and unreformed Poland and the GDR – found 
themselves on the edge of economic collapse at the end of the 1970s. With debts 
exceeding $22 billion in 1980 – more than Hungary’s and the GDR’s debts com-
bined – and with Solidarity disqualifying the possibility of introducing austerity 
measures as in Romania, Poland was the only socialist state to default.136 
Assessments of Polish policy in the 1970s vary between two positions. Accord-
ing to most contemporary Polish historians, the agenda was misplaced and rooted 
in the incompetence and short-term thinking of the Polish socialist elite. In con-
trast, the participants in the events, including politicians and experts, instead 
blame external factors and the lack of central coordination of economic matters. 
The answer to this dilemma lies in the middle. On the one hand, the Polish leader-
ship successfully tackled some challenges of the 1970s such as the demographic 
boom, modernised Poland’s industry on a scale incomparable with the 1960s 
and 1980s and effectively participated in easing Cold War tensions. Moreover, 
Gierek’s policy mirrored the modernisation efforts and credit practices not only 
of other socialist states but also of other peripheral countries around the world. 
In the case of Poland, however, the strategy was characterised by overconfidence 
and misinterpretation. Assumptions regarding the termination of the Cold War 
underlying the ambitious planning of the early 1970s and expectations concerning 
the consequences of the oil crisis and Western European integration accelerated 
the negative outcomes of the decade. As the leadership nevertheless continued the 
policy of the early 1970s, the external factors were not the only ones to blame for 
the regime’s evident decline in the early 1980s and fall at the end of the decade. 
  
   
 








   
  
   
 














   
 
 







98 Aleksandra Komornicka 
Notes 
1 For general studies on Poland’s history in the 1970s, see Kemp-Welch,  Poland under com-
munism, 180–236; Paczkowski, The spring will be ours, 351–410; Eisler,  Czterdzieści
pięć lat , 287–352.
2 E.g. Paczkowski, Revolution and counterrevolution in Poland; Friszke, Rewolucja 
Solidarności 1980–1981; Eisler,  Grudzień 1970. On critiques of this approach and 
the cultural turn in Polish historiography, see Fidelis, “Pleasures and perils of socialist 
modernity,” 1–12; Zaremba and Brzostek, “Polska 1956–1976,” 25–37. 
3 On Gomułka, see Prażmowska, Władysław Gomułka; Eisler,  Siedmiu Wspaniałych, 
167–252. On Poland in 1956, see Machcewicz, Rebelious satelite; Skrzypek, Dyplo-
matyczne dzieje PRL , 15–97. 
4 Jarosz, “The collectivization of agriculture in Poland,” 113. 
5 Skrzypek, Mechanizmy autonomii , 65–312. 
6 Jasiński, Bliżej centrum czy na peryferiach? , 231. 
7 Archiwum Akt Nowyth (AAN – Central Archives of Modern Records), KC PZPR 
1354, III/51, “Stenogram XI plenarnego posiedzenia KC PZPR” (Minutes of the 11th 
PUWP Plenary Session), 27–28 February 1968, 304. 
8 Kansikas, Socialist countries face the European Community, 59–92; See Chapter 3 by 
Pál Germuska in this book. 
9 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, XI/186, “Stenogram narady członków BP i sekretariatu KC z 
I sekretarzami KW i kierownikami wydzałów KC oraz członków Rady Ministrów i 
Prezydium Komisji Planowania” (Minutes of the PUWP and government meeting), 
16 April 1970, 256. 
10 On Poland and FRG, see Stokłosa, Polen und die deutsche Ostpolitik ; Jarząbek, Pol-
ska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa. 
11 Jarząbek, “Hope and reality,” 6. 
12 Namiotkiewicz, Byłem sekretarzem Gomułki, 80; Tejchma,  Pożegnanie z władzą , 81 
and 89; Bobrowski, “Na to nas nie stać . . .,” 190–1. 
13 On 1968 in Poland, see Eisler, “March 1968 in Poland,” 237–52; Stola,  Kampania 
antysyjonistyczna w Polsce 1967–1968. 
14 Szumiło, “Pomarcowa wymiana kadr-elita PZPR w latach 1968–1970,” 528. 
15 On Gierek, see Eisler,  Siedmiu Wspaniałych , 253–312. 
16 Dwilewicz, “Reformy Bolesława Jaszczuka,”107. 
17 Rakowski, Dzienniki 1958–1962, 124; Rakowski, Dzienniki 1969–1971, 266; Rurarz, 
Byłem doradcą Gierka , 113. 
18 Rakowski, Dzienniki 1969–1971 , 52. 
19 Józef Pajestka, “O społeczno-kulturową koncepcję motoryzacji,” Polityka 2 (1969): 3. 
20 Józef Pajestka, “Problemy polityki strukturalnej konsumpcji na obecnym etapie roz-
woju,” Nowe Drogi 10:245 (1969): 12–29; Józef Pajestka, “Smalec czy garsonka?,” 
Polityka 38 (1969): 1 and 5. 
21 See the summary of the debate: “Kierunki kształtowania struktury konsumpcji,” 
Życie Gospodarcze 10–11:964–5 (1970): 2–4. 
22 E.g. Józef Pajestka, “Na nowym etapie postępu,” Życie gospodarcze 22:872 (1968). 
23 Włodzimierz Wowczuk, ‘Japonia. Kulisy dynamicznego rozwoju’,  Życie Gospodar-
cze 14:864 (1968): 11. 
24 Marian Naszkowski, “Na widowni międzynarodowej,” Nowe Drogi 10:233 (1968): 114;
Marian Naszkowski, “Na widowni międzynarodowej,” Nowe Drogi 3:238 (1969): 40;
Marian Naszkowski, “Na widowni międzynarodowej,” Nowe Drogi 4:239 (1969): 65.
25 Marian Naszkowski, “Na widowni międzynarodowej,” 9:256 (1970): 74. 
26 Westad, “Beginnings of the end,” 68–81. 
27 Eisler, Grudzień 1970 , 59. 
28 For debates on Gierek’s arrival in power, see Szumiło, “Rozmowy Edwarda Gierka,” 
315–36; Eisler,  Grudzień 1970 , 282–93. 
 
 
















   
 
  









   
 
 
   







Poland: ‘Economic Miracle’ to ‘Sick Man’ 99 
29 Szumiło, “Kierownictwo PZPR w latach 1971–1980,” 32. 
E.g. “Poland’s new leader,” New York Times, 21 December 1970, 15; Adam Bromke,
“Beyond the Gomulka era,” Foreign Affairs 49:3 (1971): 480–90; Adam Bromke, “Poland
under Gierek. A new political style,”  Problems of Communism 21:5 (1972): 1–19.
31 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/91, “Wnioski w sprawie aktywizacji funkcji Sejmu” (calls 
for increase in parliamentary activity), 25 January 1971. 
32 E.g. AAN, URM 290, 5.4/22, “Projekt rozporządzenia Rady Ministrów w sprawie 
zakresu działania Ministra Handlu Zagranicznego i jego uprawnień w dziedzinie 
koordynacji stosunków gospodarczych z zagranicą” (draft decision concerning com-
petences of the Minister of Foreign Trade), 9 July 1971. 
33 Bożyk, Apokalipsa według Pawła, 34; Waszczuk,  Biografia niezlustrowana , 33. 
34 Dwilewicz, “Rola ekspertów,” 7–46. 
See Chapter 7 by Elitza Stanoeva and Chapter 3 by Pál Germuska in this book. 
36 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/100, “Główne propozycje, zadania i problem projektu 
planu 5-letniego na lata 1971–1975-plan podstawowy” (main tasks of five-year plan), 
Planning Commission, accepted by the politburo, 15 February 1972, 4. 
37 E.g. Dwilewicz, “Polityka gospodarcza,” 333–53; Jarząbek, “Polish economic pol-
icy,” 298. 
38 “Główne propozycje,” 14. 
39 Council of State decision no. 203, 20 July 1972, accessed February 2020, http:// 
prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU19720290203/O/D19720203.pdf . 
Rurarz, Byłem doradcą , 157. 
41 Rurarz, Byłem doradcą , 162-3. 
42 Zdzisław Rurarz, “Przesłanki przyspieszonego rozwoju kraju,” Nowe Drogi 10:281 
(1972): 137. 
43 “Główne propozycje,” 3. 
44 AAN, URM 290, 5.4/20, “Zamierzenia w zakresie polityki licencyjnej w latach 
1971–1975 na tle dotychczasowych wyników wykorzystania zakupów licencyjnych 
w krajach kapitalistycznych” (plans concerning license policy), Committee of Sci-
ence and Technology, accepted by the government, 14 May 1971. 
“Główne propozycje,” 17. 
46  Eisler, Czterdzieści pięć lat , 293. 
47 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, XIA/1172, “Koncepcje Rozwoju Gospodarczego Polski w
latach 1971–1995” (concepts of Poland’s economic development), Rurarz’s report for
Gierek, 24.
48  AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/90, “Protokół nr 24 posiedzenia Biura Politycznego” (Pro-
tocol from the politburo meeting), 29 December 1970, 3. 
49 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/92, “Notatka w sprawie kierunkowych założeń rozwoju gos-
podarki narodowej w latach 1971–1975” (memo on the direction of Poland’s economic
development), Planning Commission, accepted by the politburo, 16 April 1971, 9.
 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/93, Gomułka’s letter to PUWP Central Committee, 27 
March 1971, 25. 
51  Kostikow and Roliński, Widziane z Kremla , 152. 
52 On Poland and the Soviet Union in the 1970s, see Szumski, “Leonid Brezhnev and 
Edward Gierek,” 253–86; Borodziej, “Polskie peryferie polityki,” 51–72; Skrzypek, 
Mechanizmy klientelizmu , 119–221. 
53  “Notatka w sprawie kierunkowych,” 8. 
54 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/90, “Podstawowe założenia projektu Narodowego Planu 
Gospodarczego na 1971” (economic plan proposal), Planning Commission, accepted 
by the politburo, 30 October 1970, 3. 
AAN, KC PZPR 1354, XIA/415, “Dyskusja na posiedzeniu Komisji Partyjno-
Rządowej d/s usprawnienia gospodarki narodowej” (Minutes from the Commission 




   
 
   
   
   
   
 
  











   
 
 
   
   
 
 
   
   
 
 
   
   
   
100 Aleksandra Komornicka 
56 Rurarz, Byłem doradcą , 82–4. 
57 Bożyk, Marzenia i rzeczywistość, 221; Rurarz, Byłem doradcą , 83. 
58 Kramer, “The Czechoslovak crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine,” 169. 
59  AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/100, “Protokół nr 11 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego” 
(Protocol from the politburo meeting), 28 February 1972, 2. 
60 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, XIA/337, ‘Stenogram z posiedzenia komisji zjazdowej” 
(Minutes from Congress Commission meeting), 23 July 1971, 51. 
61 On propaganda in the 1970s, see Zaremba, “Propaganda sukcesu,” 22–32. 
62 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/92, “Kierunki działania Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych 
na rok 1971” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs guidelines for 1971), accepted by the polit-
buro, 11 May 1971, 12–21 and 25–7. 
63 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/91, “Pilna notatka” (Memo on diplomatic visits), Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, accepted by the politburo, 2 March 1971. 
64  AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/120, “Węzłowe kierunki i zadania polityki zagranicznej 
PRL w 1974” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs guidelines for 1974), accepted by the polit-
buro, 15 January 1974, 3. 
65  Mazur, Propagandowy obraz świata , 179–80. 
66 E.g. Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych (AMWZ – Archive of the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs), Dep. IV, 27/77, w.10, “Program pracy na 1971” (work 
plan for 1971), March 1971, 3; Jerzy Sułek, “Prognoza rozwoju Europy w latach 
siedemdziesiątych,” Sprawy Międzynarodowe, 3:250 (1973): 104–10. 
67 E.g. Janusz Gołębiowski, “Socjaldemokracja a problemy współczesności,” Nowe 
Drogi, 12:283 (1972): 76–85. 
68  Jan Główczyk, “Przesłanki europejskiej współpracy gospodarczej,” Polska Prasa, 
10 (1972): 9; Mieczysław Rakowski, “Szanse na wielki pokój,” Nowe Drogi , 11:282 
(1972): 69; AMSZ, Dep. IV, 27/77, w.10, “Perspektywiczny plan działania w sto-
sunku do krajów Europy Zachodniej” (prospective plan concerning Western Europe), 
9 July 1971, 1. 
69 Frelek, Historia zimnej wojny , 24. 
70  Gierek and Rolicki, Przerwana dekada , 105. 
71 On relations between the PUWP and the church in the 1970s, see Pawlicka,  Polityka 
władz wobec kościoła katolickiego; Dudek and Gruz, Komuniści i Kościół , 277–350. 
72 Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia? , 486–7. 
73 Paczkowski, The spring will be ours , 351. 
74 “Tabela obrotów handlu zagranicznego” in  Rocznik statystyczny 1976 , 333. 
75 Bożyk, Marzenia i rzeczywistość , 101. 
76  Machcewicz, “Materiały: Polityka Zagraniczna PRL w roku 1975,” 120. 
77 On bilateral relations with Western European states see, e.g., Jarosz and Pasztor, 
Polska-Francja, 1970–1980. Relacje wyjątkowe?; Tavani, “Muddling through the 
European bloc system,” 147–68; On FRG and Poland, see Stokłosa, Polen und die 
deutsche Ostpolitik; Jarząbek, Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa. On Polish foreign 
policy in specific years, see the introductions to volumes Polskie Dokumenty Dyp-
lomatyczne (Polish Diplomatic Documents) published by Polski Instytut Spraw 
Międzynarodowych (Polish Institute of International Affairs); On diplomacy in the 
1970s in general, see Skrzypek, Dyplomatyczne dzieje PRL , 188–302. 
78 E.g. Życie Warszawy, 3 October 1972, 2. 
79 Bożyk, Marzenia i rzeczywistość, 35 and 46; Pajestka, Polski kryzys, 52; Rurarz, 
Byłem doradcą , 63. 
80  Kostikow and Roliński, Widziane z Kremla , 171. 
81 The UK National Archives (TNA), FCO 28/1931, “The Polish economy,” Fretwell’s 
report from Warsaw, 27 September 1972, 6. 
82 AMSZ, Dep. IV, 27/77, w.11, Staniszewski to Paszek, 29 June 1971. 
83 E.g. AMSZ, Dep. IV, 27/77, w.11, Olszowski to Jaroszewicz, 7 August 1971. 
 
   
 
   
 
 
   
   
   
   
   





   
   
  
  
   
  
   
  
    
 









Poland: ‘Economic Miracle’ to ‘Sick Man’ 101 
84 Kansikas, “Room to manoeuvre?,” 200–2; See Chapter 3 by Pál Germuska in this 
book. 
 “Kierunki działania,” 20–1. 
86 AAN, URM 290, KT 75/8, “Notatka w sprawie kredytów na import z krajów kapi-
talistycznych rozwiniętych w okresie 1972–1975” (memo on credits from capitalist 
states), Ministry of Foreign Trade, February 1972, 10. 
87 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/101, “Wstępne poglądy strony polskiej w sprawie sto-
sunków pomiędzy RWPG i krajami EWG” (on attitudes towards EEC-CMEA rela-
tions), Ministry of Foreign Trade, accepted by the politburo, 14 March 1972, 12. 
88  Romano, “Untying Cold War knots,” 153–73. 
89 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/93, “Zasady polityki kredytowej w zakresie obrotów 
płatniczych z zagranicą w latach 1971–1975” (report on credit policy), Planning 
Commission, accepted by the politburo and government, July 1971, 8. 
AMSZ, Dep. IV, 20/79, w.11, “Plan pracy na 1974” (work plan for 1974), December 
1973, 3. 
91 AAN, URM 290, 5.4/71, “Podstawowe zasady koordynacji planów z krajami RWPG 
na lata 1976–1980” (report on coordination of planning between CMEA countries), 
Planning Commission, accepted by the government, January 1974, 1. 
92 AAN, URM 290, 5.4/71, “Informacja w sprawie podstawowych problemów real-
izacji NPSG w 1974 roku” (report on problems with fulfilling five-year plan), Plan-
ning Commission, accepted by the government, 5 February 1974, 9. 
93 E.g. AAN, URM 290, 5.4/71, “Zapis przebiegu obrad posiedzenia Prezydium Rządu” 
(minutes from government meeting,) 8 February 1974, 86–106. 
94 AMSZ, Dep. IV, 46/77, w.10, “Pilna notatka dotycząca militarnych aspketów funk-
cjonowania EWG” (memo on military aspects of the EEC), Jaruzelski, 2 April
1972.
 “Informacja w sprawie,” 9–10. 
96 Bień, Jak doszło do zadłużenia Polski, 18-24; Rurarz, Byłem doradcą , 75. 
97 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/110, “Skrót wypowiedzi F. Szlachcica na posiedzeniu Biura 
Politycznego” (Szlachci’s speech during the politburo meeting,) 11 December 1972, 
2–3. 
98 Barcikowski, U szczytów władzy, 65; Gierek and Rolicki, Przerwana dekada, 162; 
Tejchma,  Kulisy dymisji , 132. 
99 Rurarz, Byłem doradcą , 131–71. 
On WOG, see Slay, The Polish economy , 36–42. 
101 Kotowicz-Jawor, Presja inwestycyjna. For other authors describing the phenomenon, 
see Balcerowicz, Przetarg planistyczny ; Kuczyński, Po wielkim skoku. 
102 E.g. AAN, URM 290, 5.4/72, “Zapis przebiegu obrad posiedzenia Prezydium Rządu” 
(minutes from the government meeting), 1 March 1974, 41–52. 
103 “Skrót wypowiedzi,” 11 December 1972, 3. 
104 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/110, “Uchwała Biura Politycznego KC PZPR o zasadach 
koordynacji i organizacji stosunków PRL z zagranicą” (decision concerning the coor-
dination of foreign relations), December 1972. 
Rakowski, Dzienniki, 1972–1975, 163; Tejchma,  Odszedł Gomułka, 133; Waszczuk, 
Biografia niezlustrowana , 64. 
106 Gierek and Rolicki, Przerwana dekada, 84; Rakowski, Dzienniki, 1979–1981 , 30. 
107 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/131, “Podstawowe założenia społeczno-gospodarczego roz-
woju kraju 1976–1980” (five-year plan proposal), Planning Commission, accepted by 
the politburo and government, 6 June 1975. 
108 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/134, “Węzłowe kierunki i zadania polityki zagranicznej w 
1976 r.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs guidelines for 1976), accepted by the politburo, 
January 1976. 
109 Tejchma, Kulisy dymisji , 221. 
   
  
   
 
  

















   
  
  
   







102 Aleksandra Komornicka 
110 On the events of 1976, see Kemp-Welch,  Poland under communism, 206–36; 
Zaremba, “Upalny czerwiec 1976,” 106–19. 
111 AAN, KC PZPR 1354, XIA/486, “Możliwości i warunki kontynuacji strategii 
dynamicznego rozwoju Polski w latach 1977–1980” (report on strategy of dynamic 
development), Planning Commission and Bożyk’s team for Gierek, 20 October 1976. 
112 E.g. AAN, URM 290, 5.4/135, “Zapis przebiegu obrad posiedzenia Prezydium 
Rządu” (minutes from the government meeting), 18 February 1977, 22–78. 
 113 E.g. Das Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (PA/AA), BA63/122531, “Ver-
schuldungssituation Polens,” 21 August 1978; Centre des Archives diplomatiques de 
la Courneuve (CADC) 1929/4594, “Relations économique franco-polonaises, Minis-
tre de l’Economie,” 14 September 1978; Mourlon-Druol, “The role of a creditor in the 
making of a debt crisis.” 
 114 Lipski, KOR ; Skórzyński, Siła bezsilnych. 
115 E.g. AAN, KC PZPR 1354, V/139, “Pilna notatka dotycząca rezultatów oficjalnej wiz-
yty w W. Brytanii Prezesa Rady Ministrów Piotra Jaroszewicza” (memo on Jarosze-
wicz’s visit to the UK), 18 December 1976, 4; AAN, KC PZPR 1354, XIA/662, “Pilna
Notatka z oficjalnej wizyty we Francji I Sekretarza Komitetu Centralnego PZPR, Tow.
Edwarda Gierka” (memo of Gierek’s visit to France), 17 September 1977, 19. 
 116 Jarząbek, “A trap and a chance,” 150–60. 
 117 Rakowski, Dzienniki, 1976–1978 , 220. 
 118 Rakowski, Dzienniki 1976–1978, 199, 301 and 440; Rakowski, Dzienniki, 1979– 
1981, 21, 42 and 46. 
 119 Lüthi, “Drifting apart,” 382. 
120 Majewski, “Polityka zagraniczna PRL w roku 1977,” 115–17. 
121 Romano, “Untying Cold War knots,” 15–7. 
122 See Chapter 1 by Federico Romero in this book. 
123 Rakowski, Dzienniki 1976–1978 , 416. 
124 Rakowski, Dzienniki 1976–1978 , 398. 
125 Pawłow,  Generał Pawłow, 84–5; Rakowski, Dzienniki 1976–1978 , 292–3. 
126 Rakowski, Dzienniki, 1979–1981 , 141. 
127 Kozłowski, Raporty dla Edwarda Gierka , 192. 
128 Bień, Jak doszło do zadłużenia Polski, 80–1; Karcz, Zadłużenie zagraniczne Polski, 
29 and 57–8. 
129 AMSZ, Dep. IV, 1/83, w.17, “Stanowisko Polski wobec projektu porozumienia RWPG-
EWG” (Polish attitude to EEC-CMEA agreement), Rurarz, 14 November 1977. 
130 AMSZ, ZD, 24/79, w.11, Olszowski to Gierek, 17 March 1977 in Majewski,  Polskie 
dokumenty dyplomatyczne 1977 , 234–6. 
131 Kubik, The power of symbols , 31–74. 
132 Kubik, The power of symbols, 129–52; Zaremba, “Karol Wojtyła,” 317–36. 
133 E.g. Ash, The Polish Revolution, 13–34. Staniszkis, Poland’s self-limiting , 150–88. 
134 Rakowski, Dzienniki, 1979–1981 , 130. 
135 Although Poland declared default, the creditors did not proclaim it officially insol-
vent. See Bartel, “Fugitive leverage.” 
136 See Chapter 5 by Maximilian Graf and Chapter 3 by Pál Germuska in this book. 
Bibliography 
Published primary sources 
Polskie dokumenty dyplomatyczne 1977, edited by Piotr M. Majewski, Warszawa: Polski 
Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2009. 
Raporty dla Edwarda Gierka, edited by Krzysztof Kozłowski, Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnic-






























Poland: ‘Economic Miracle’ to ‘Sick Man’ 103 
 Secondary sources 
Ash, Timothy Garton.  The Polish Revolution: Solidarity. London: Jonathan Cape, 1983. 
Balcerowicz, Ewa. Przetarg planistyczny: mechanizmy i skutki społeczno-gospodarcze. 
Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1990. 
Barcikowski, Kazimierz. U szczytów władzy. Warszawa: Projekt, 1998. 
Bartel, Fritz. “Fugitive leverage: commercial banks, sovereign debt, and Cold War crisis in 
Poland, 1980–1982.” Enterprise & Society 18:1 (2017): 72–107. 
Bień, Witold. Jak doszło do zadłużenia Polski za granicą w latach 1970–1985. Wspomnie-
nia uczestnika wydarzeń. Warszawa: Difin, 2017. 
 Bobrowski, Czesław. “Na to nas nie stać. . . .” In Władysław Gomułka we wspomnieniach, 
edited by Bronisław Syzdek, 184–96. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie, 1989. 
 Borodziej, Włodzimierz. “Polskie peryferie polityki zagranicznej Związku Radzieckiego-
lata siedemdziesiąte.” In Modernizacja. Centrum. Peryferie. Księga jubileuszowa z okazji
70. Rocznicy urodzin Profesora Ryszarda Stemplowskiego, edited by Włodzimierz Boro-
dziej and Sławomir Dębski, 51–72. Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych,
2009. 
Bożyk, Paweł. Marzenia i rzeczywistość, czyli anatomia polskiego kryzysu. Warszawa: 
Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1983. 
Bożyk, Paweł. Apokalipsa według Pawła. Jak zniszczono nasz kraj? Wrocław: Wektory, 2015.
Dudek, Antoni and Ryszard Gruz.  Komuniści i Kościół w Polsce 1945–1989. Kraków: 
Znak, 2003. 
Dwilewicz, Łukasz. “Polityka gospodarcza, a spokój społeczny. Posunięcia władz partyjnych
i państwowych od grudnia 1970 r do grudnia 1971.” In Gospodarka i społeczeństwo w 
czasach PRL-u, edited by Elżbieta Kościk and Tomasz Głowiński, 333–53. Wrocław: 
Gajt, 2007. 
Dwilewicz, Łukasz. “Rola ekspertów w zarządzaniu gospodarką PRL w latach
siedemdziesiątych.” Studia Polityczne 24 (2009): 7–46. 
Dwilewicz, Łukasz. “Reformy Bolesława Jaszczuka i polityka gospodarcza ekipy
gierkowskiej- zwrot i ciągłość.” In Dekada Gierka. Wnioski dla obecnego okresu mod-
ernizacji Polski, edited by Krzysztof Rybiński, 73–120. Warszawa: Wyższa Szkoła 
Ekonomiczno-Informatyczna, 2011. 
Eisler, Jerzy.  Grudzień 1970. Geneza, przebieg, konsekwencje. Warszawa: Sensacje XX 
wieku, 2000. 
Eisler, Jerzy. “March 1968 in Poland.” In  1968: the world transformed, edited by Carole 
Fink, Philipp Gassert and Detlef Junker, 237–52. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013. 
Eisler, Jerzy.  Siedmiu wspaniałych. Poczet pierwszych sekretarzy KC PZPR. Warszawa: 
Czerwone i Czarne, 2014. 
Eisler, Jerzy.  Czterdzieści pięć lat, które wstrząsnęło Polską. Historia polityczna PRL. 
Warszawa: Czerwone i Czarne, 2018. 
 Fidelis, Małgorzata. “Pleasures and perils of socialist modernity: new scholarship on post-
war Eastern Europe.” Contemporary European History 25:4 (2016): 1–12. 
 Friszke, Andrzej. Rewolucja Solidarności 1980–1981. Kraków: Znak, 2014. 
Gierek, Edward and Bohdan Rolicki. Przerwana dekada. Warszawa: Fakt, 1990. 
Jarosz, Dariusz. “The collectivization of agriculture in Poland: causes of defeat.” In The col-
lectivisation of agriculture in communist Eastern Europe, edited by Constantin Iordachi 
and Arnd Bauerkämper, 113–46. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2014. 
Jarosz, Dariusz and Maria Pasztor.  Polska-Francja, 1970–1980. Relacje wyjątkowe?






























104 Aleksandra Komornicka 
Jarząbek, Wanda. “Hope and reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe, 1964–1989.” Working Paper No. 56. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson 
International Centre for Scholars, 2008. 
Jarząbek, Wanda. Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa wobec polityki wschodniej Repub-
liki Federalnej Niemiec w latach 1966–1976: wymiar dwustronny i międzynarodowy. 
Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2011. 
Jarząbek, Wanda. “Polish economic policy at the time of détente.”  European Review of 
History 21:2 (2014): 293–309. 
Jarząbek, Wanda. “A trap and a chance: Basket III, dissidents and state authorities in Com-
munist Poland.” In Human Rights in Europe during the Cold War, edited by Rasmus 
Mariagerm Karl Molin and Kjersti Brathagen, 150–60. Abingdon: Routledge, 2014. 
Jasiński, Leszek. Bliżej centrum czy na peryferiach? Polskie kontakty gospodarcze z 
zagranicą w XX wieku. Warszawa: Trio, 2011. 
Kansikas, Suvi. “Room to manoeuvre? National interests and coalition-building in the 
CMEA, 1969–75.” In Reassessing Cold War Europe, edited by Sari Autio-Sarasmo and 
Katalin Mikló ssy, 193–209. Abingdon, Routledge, 2011. 
Kansikas, Suvi. Socialist countries face the European Community: Soviet-bloc controver-
sies over East-West trade. New York: Peter Lang, 2014. 
Karcz, Zbigniew.  Zadłużenia zagraniczne Polski. Gra o miliardy. Kiedy do Euro?
Warszawa: Difin, 2006. 
 Kemp-Welch, Anthony. Poland under communism: a Cold War history. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2008. 
Kramer, Mark. “The Czechoslovak crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine.” In  1968: the world 
transformed, edited by Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert and Detlef Junker, 111–71. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Kostikow, Piotr and Bohdan Roliński. Widziane z Kremla, Moskwa-Warszawa. Gra o 
Polskę. Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1992. 
Kotowicz-Jawor, Joanna.  Presja inwestycyjna w latach siedemdziesiątych. Warszawa: 
Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1983. 
Kubik, Jan. The power of symbols against the symbols of power: the rise of Solidarity and 
the fall of state socialism in Poland. University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 
1994. 
Kuczyński, Waldemar. Po wielkim skoku. Warszawa: NOWA, 1979. 
Lipski, Jan Józef. KOR: a history of the Workers Defense Committee in Poland, 1976– 
1981. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 
Lüthi, Lorenz M. “Drifting apart: Soviet energy and the cohesion of the communist bloc in 
the 1970s and 1980s.” In Cold War energy: a transnational history of Soviet oil and gas, 
edited by Jeronim Perović, 371–400. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. 
Machcewicz, Paweł. Rebelious satelite: Poland 1956. Translated by Maya Latynski. 
Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2009. 
 Machcewicz, Paweł. “Materiały: Polityka Zagraniczna PRL w roku 1975.”  Polski Przegląd 
Dyplomatyczny 4:62 (2011): 119–52. 
Majewski, Piotr. “Polityka zagraniczna PRL w roku 1977.”  Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny
52:6 (2010): 108–38. 
Mazur, Mariusz.  Propagandowy obraz świata. Polityczne kampanie prasowe w PRL 1956– 
1980. Warszawa: Trio, 2003. 
Mourlon-Druol, Emmanuel. “The role of a creditor in the making of a debt crisis: the French






























Poland: ‘Economic Miracle’ to ‘Sick Man’ 105 
constraints, 1958–1971.” Financial History Review (2020): 1–22. Accessed 18 March 
2020.  https://doi.org/10.1017/S0968565019000222 . 
 Namiotkiewicz, Walery. Byłem sekretarzem Gomułki. Warszawa: Comandor, 2002. 
 Paczkowski, Andrzej. The spring will Be ours: Poland and the Poles from occupation to free-
dom. Translated by Jane Cave. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003.
 Paczkowski, Andrzej. Revolution and counterrevolution in Poland 1980–1989: Solidar-
ity, martial law, and the end of communism in Europe. Translated by Christina Manetti. 
Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2015. 
Pajestka, Józef. Polski kryzys, 1980–1981. Jak to do niego doszło i co rokuje? Warszawa: 
Książka i Wiedza, 1981. 
Pawlicka, Katarzyna. Polityka władz wobec kościoła katolickiego: grudzień 1970-
październik 1978. Warszawa: Trio, 2004. 
Pawłow, Witalij. Generał Pawłow: byłem rezydentem KGB w Polsce. Warszawa: Oficyna 
Wydawnicza BGW, 1994. 
Prażmowska, Anita. Władysław Gomułka a biography. London: I.B. Tauris, 2015. 
 Rakowski, Mieczysław.  Dzienniki polityczne 1958–1962. Warszawa: Iskry, 1998. 
 Rakowski, Mieczysław.  Dzienniki polityczne 1969–1971. Warszawa: Iskry, 2001. 
 Rakowski, Mieczysław.  Dzienniki polityczne, 1972–1975. Warszawa: Iskry, 2002. 
 Rakowski, Mieczysław,  Dzienniki polityczne, 1976–1978. Warszawa: Iskry, 2002. 
Romano, Angela. “Untying Cold War knots: the European Community and Eastern Europe 
in the long 1970s.” Cold War History 14:2 (2014): 153–73. 
 Rurarz, Zdzisław.  Byłem doradcą Gierka. Chicago: Andy Grafik, 1990. 
Skórzyński, Jan. Siła bezsilnych. Historia Komitetu Obrony Robotników. Warszawa: Świat 
Książki, 2012. 
 Skrzypek, Andrzej. Mechanizmy autonomii: stosunki polsko-radzieckie 1956–65. Pułtusk: 
Akademia Humanistyczna im. A. Gieysztora, 2008. 
 Skrzypek, Andrzej. Mechanizmy klientelizmu. Stosunki polsko-radzieckie 1964–1989. 
Pułtusk: Akademia Humanistyczna im. A. Gieysztora, 2008. 
 Skrzypek, Andrzej. Dyplomatyczne dzieje PRL w latach 1956–1989. Pułtusk: Akademia 
Humanistyczna im. A. Gieysztora, 2010. 
Slay, Ben.  The Polish economy: crisis, reform, and transformation. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994. 
Staniszkis, Jadwiga. Poland’s self-limiting revolution. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1984. 
Stokłosa, Katarzyna. Polen und die deutsche Ostpolitik 1945–1990. Göttingen: Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, 2011. 
Stola, Dariusz. Kampania antysyjonistyczna w Polsce 1967–1968. Warszawa: Instytut 
Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2000. 
Stola, Dariusz. Kraj bez wyjścia? Migracje z Polski 1949–1989. Warszawa: Instytut 
Pamięci Narodowej, 2010. 
Szumiło, Mirosław. “Rozmowy Edwarda Gierka z dyplomatami sowieckimi w latach 
1963–1965 (dokumenty odnalezione w RGASPI).” Komunizm: system, ludzie, doku-
mentacja 2 (2013): 315–36. 
Szumiło, Mirosław. “Kierownictwo PZPR w latach 1971–1980.” In  PRL na pochylni 
(1975–1980), edited by Marcin Bukała and Dariusz Iwaneczko, 30–59. Rzeszów: Insty-
tut Pamięci Narodowej, 2017. 
Szumiło, Mirosław. “Pomarcowa wymiana kadr-elita PZPR w latach 1968–1970.” In 



















106 Aleksandra Komornicka 
65 rocznicę urodzin, edited by Jan Olaszek, Antoni Dudek, Łukasz Kamiński, Krzysz-
tof Kosiński, Michał Przeperski, Konrad Rokicki, Paweł Sasanka, Robert Spałek and 
Sławomir Stępień, 514–28. Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2017. 
Szumski, Jakub. “Leonid Brezhnev and Edward Gierek: The making and breaking of an 
uneven friendship.” Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 45:3 (2018): 253–86. 
Tavani, Sara. “Muddling through the European bloc system: the evolution of Italian-Polish 
relations over the 1970s and 1980s.” In Disintegration and integration in East-Central 
Europe: 1919-post-1989, edited by Wilfried Loth and Nicolae Pãun, 147–68. Baden-
Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2014. 
Tejchma, Józef.  Kulisy dymisji. Z dzienników ministra kultury. Kraków: Oficyna Cracovia, 
1991. 
Tejchma, Józef.  Pożegnanie z władzą. Warszawa: Projekt, 1998. 
Tejchma, Józef.  Odszedł Gomułka przyszedł Gierek. Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2006. 
Waszczuk, Jerzy.  Biografia niezlustrowana: zapamiętywanie czasu nieutraconego. Warszawa:
Studio Emka, 2007.
Westad, Odd Arne. “Beginnings of the end: how the Cold War crumbled.” In  Reinterpret-
ing the end of the Cold War: issues, interpretations, periodizations, edited by Silvio Pons 
and Federico Romero, 68–81. London: Frank Cass, 2011. 
Zaremba, Marcin. “Upalny czerwiec 1976.” Więź 6:512 (2001): 106–19. 
Zaremba, Marcin. “Propaganda sukcesu. Dekada Gierka.” In Propaganda w PRL, edited 
by Piotr Semków, 22–32. Gdańsk: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2004. 
Zaremba, Marcin. “Karol Wojtyła the pope: complications for comrades of the Polish 
United Workers’ Party.”  Cold War History 5:3 (2005): 317–36. 
Zaremba, Marcin and Błażej Brzostek. “Polska 1956–1976: w poszukiwaniu paradyg-
matu.” Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość 5:2 (2006): 25–37. 
